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U.N. Sovereign Immunity: Using the 
Haitian Experience to Transition from 
Absolute to Qualified Immunity 
BRIANNA SAINTE* 
The United Nations (“U.N.”) has been looked at globally 
and historically as an international organization that has 
given aid to millions of people in the hopes of promoting 
peace and reducing human rights violations. It is no surprise 
then that many countries have welcomed U.N. troops with 
open arms in the hopes of stabilizing communities. However, 
instead of receiving aid, imagine receiving a deadly disease. 
Imagine having the nearby river that has been your only 
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source of water for drinking, laundry, and bathing for dec-
ades turned into a waste dump. It is from that river turned 
waste dump that you—and hundreds of thousands of other 
innocent people—have now contracted cholera.  
This was the reality for thousands of Haitian citizens 
who now continue to suffer from cholera due to a U.N. 
base’s negligent disposal of its troops’ waste into a river the 
Haitian citizens depended on for survival. Despite being re-
sponsible for the cholera epidemic now plaguing Haiti—a 
third world country with too few resources struggling to sup-
port its citizens—the U.N. has failed to not only properly re-
spond to the outbreak, but also to accept legal responsibility  
This Note discusses different options to bring about fi-
nancial, legal, and actual relief to the victims of the cholera 
outbreak in Haiti. It reviews the failed attempts of Haitian 
victims to hold the U.N. legally accountable for its actions 
and seeks to answer the following question: in what ways 
can relief be achieved, if at all, in the human rights realm. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“[T]he maintenance of international peace and security” is the 
mission statement put forth by the United Nations (“U.N.”), an in-
tergovernmental organization created in 1945 in response to the 
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tragedy of the World War II.1 What was once a fledgling alliance 
between fifty-one member states to prevent another world war has 
now grown into the largest intergovernmental organization compris-
ing of 193 member states.2 To realize the U.N.’s mission, U.N. 
peacekeeping troops are deployed to various parts of the world with 
the responsibility of creating the infrastructure needed to establish 
and maintain peace.3 However, this task involves a complex web of 
international and domestic law and leaves large, gaping holes in ju-
risprudence concerning international organizations and the ability of 
the U.N. to operate within those gaps without consequence or ac-
countability.4  
It is common practice for the U.N. to set up Status of Force 
Agreements (“SOFAs”) between itself and the foreign state in which 
peacekeeping troops are to be deployed.5  Under the 1994 Conven-
tion on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, all 
involved parties, including nation states and U.N. subsidiaries, are 
obliged to enter into SOFAs that cover all activities and personnel 
associated with U.N. operations in a foreign state.6 SOFAs involv-
ing U.N. peacekeeping operations customarily contain an immunity 
clause that reinforces the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Im-
munities of the United Nations (“General Convention”) and the 
U.N. Charter.7 Together, the 1946 and 1994 conventions grant the 
                                                                                                         
 1  What We Do, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.UN.org/en/sections/what-we-
do/ (last visited June 24, 2018).  
 2  History of the United Nations, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.UN.org/en/ 
sections/history/history-united-nations/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2018); International 
Organization, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, https://www.nationalgeographic.org/ency-
clopedia/international-organization/ (last visited Dec. 10, 2017); Member States, 
UNITED NATIONS, http://www.UN.org/en/member-states/ (last visited Sept. 14, 
2018).  
 3   International Organization, supra note 2.  
 4   See generally Rosa Freedman, U.N. Immunity or Impunity? A Human 
Rights Based Challenge, 25 EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 239, 242–45 (2014) (discussing 
developments in jurisprudence over the past fifty years moving away from giving 
intergovernmental organizations absolute immunity). 
 5   Dieter Fleck, The Legal Status of Personnel Involved in the United Nations 
Peace Operations, 95 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 613, 621 (2013). 
 6  Id. at 620–21; GA Res. 49/59, annex, Convention on the Safety of United 
Nations and Associated Personnel (Dec. 9, 1994), 34 I.L.M. 482 [hereinafter 
Safety Convention].  
 7  Safety Convention, supra note 6; see U.N. Charter art. 105, ¶ 1; Conven-
tion on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations art. 2, Feb. 13, 1946, 
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U.N. sovereign immunity and immunity for civilian personnel work-
ing on behalf of the U.N.8  While immunity is viewed as necessary 
to ensure the effective performance of peace operations, SOFAs 
drafted for U.N. peacekeeping operations provide countermeasures 
to safeguard the rights of private citizens and the host country itself.9 
It is these countermeasures, including alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms such as the establishment of claims commissions and 
lump-sum payments, that the U.N. uses to justify the immunity 
granted to it in the SOFAs.10 In theory, SOFAs are meant to help 
close the gap between international and domestic law.11 In practice, 
however, this goal is rarely ever reached.12 
In recent years, questions have arisen regarding the lack of ac-
countability when countermeasures included in SOFAs have failed 
to be implemented, which has allowed for the actions of the U.N. to 
go unchecked due to its benefit of receiving immunity.13 Such a fail-
ure is exemplified by the U.N.’s operations in Haiti over the last 
seven years. In 2010, a cholera outbreak occurred that ravaged the 
already devastated country of Haiti.14 When reports emerged that 
the U.N. may have been responsible for the outbreak, the U.N. de-
nied responsibility.15 With the cholera epidemic now affecting over 
                                                                                                         
1 U.S.T. 1418, 1 U.N.T.S. 15. [hereinafter Privileges and Immunities Conven-
tion]; see also Freedman, supra note 4, at 247–8 (describing the immunities af-
forded by the U.N.’s Model SOFA). 
 8  Safety Convention, supra note 6; Privileges and Immunities Convention, 
supra note 7; Freedman, supra note 4, at 243 (“[M]ost [states] insist that the 
U.N. . . . retains absolute immunity.”).  
 9  Fleck, supra note 5, at 615–16 (describing the origins of immunity and its 
application in peacekeeping operations); Freedman, supra note 4, at 247 (apprais-
ing the Model SOFA and its provisions for alternative dispute resolution mecha-
nisms as countermeasures to peacekeepers’ immunity). 
 10  Freedman, supra note 4, at 241, 245–47. 
 11  See Fleck, supra note 5, at 621, 629–34 (discussing common tensions and 
regulatory gaps that arise when international bodies and state governments nego-
tiate and implement SOFAs). 
 12  Id. 
 13  See Freedman, supra note 4, at 246. 
 14  Somini Sengupta, U.N. Apologizes for Role in Haiti’s 2010 Cholera Out-
break, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016 /12/01/world/ 
americas/united-nations-apology-haiti-cholera.html. 
 15  Id.; Kristina Duagirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson, Contemporary Practice 
of the United States Relating to International Law, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. 784, 819 
(2014).  
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hundreds of thousands of Haitian victims, a global spotlight has 
been placed on the ramifications felt by Haitian victims who have 
yet to obtain monetary relief from the operations conducted by U.N. 
peacekeepers within that region.16  
Many international news articles and journals have focused on 
the epidemic in Haiti and the U.N.’s lack of accountability.17 This 
Note will focus on possible avenues of relief for Haitian victims. It 
will also address as future policy solutions that combat U.N. immun-
ity in the hope that, in the midst of the complex conversation con-
cerning how the U.N. will be allowed to operate in the future, the 
victims who were affected by the cholera outbreak may somehow 
achieve the justice they deserve.  
Part I of this Note will summarize the beginnings of the cholera 
outbreak in Haiti as well as its impact on the locals, thereby detailing 
the foundation for the causal element of a legal framework that will 
also be discussed. Part II will examine the legal arguments presented 
by the victims in a previous petition to the U.N. as well as civil ac-
tions brought in United States federal courts. Part III will detail the 
lives of just a few of the victims of the cholera outbreak, so as to 
remember those victims and survivors who are sometimes forgotten. 
Finally, Part IV will examine the idea of using a human-rights based 
approach to challenge the U.N.’s absolute immunity. It will also dis-
cuss how such a challenge can lead to the emergence of a new norm 
in which the U.N. operates under a modified immunity. 
I. ORIGINS OF THE CHOLERA OUTBREAK IN HAITI 
In August 2016, six years after the first cases of cholera were 
reported in 2010, then Secretary General Ban Ki-moon of the U.N. 
                                                                                                         
 16  Randal C. Archibold & Somini Sengupta, U.N. Struggles to Stem Haiti 
Cholera Epidemic, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/ 
04/20/world/americas/U.N.-struggles-to-stem-haiti-cholera-epidemic.html; 
Sengupta, supra note 14.  
 17   See, e.g., American Society of International Law, Contemporary Practice 
of the United States Relating To International Law, 111 AM. J. INT’L L. 155, 162 
(2017); Thomas G. Bode, Cholera in Haiti: United Nations Immunity and Ac-
countability, 47 GEO. J. INT’L L. 759 (2016); Farhana Choudhury, The United Na-
tions Immunity Regime: Seeking a Balance between Unfettered Protection and 
Accountability, 104 GEO. L.J. 725 (2016); Duagirdas & Mortenson, supra note 
15, at 819; Devika Hovell, Due Process in the United Nations, 110 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 1 (2016). 
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publicly acknowledged, for the first time,  that the U.N. “played a 
role” in the cholera outbreak in Haiti.18 The public announcement 
also came five years after an independent, four-person panel of ex-
perts launched a full-scale investigation, under U.N. auspices, and 
quietly released a report in 2011 that came to a similar conclusion.19   
Cholera, “an acute, diarrheal illness caused by infection of the 
intestine with the bacterium Vibrio cholera,” is usually spread by 
the ingestion of contaminated food or water.20  Though the infection 
is often mild and can result in no symptoms at all, symptoms can 
turn severe and lead to death if treatment, such as proper rehydra-
tion, is not administered.21 Symptoms include severe dehydration, 
extreme vomiting, dizziness, and diarrhea.22 
The source of the initial cholera outbreak in Haiti was traced to 
a U.N. base located in the rural Centre Department of Haiti.23 Spe-
cifically, the base was a United Nations Stabilisation Mission in 
Haiti (“MINUSTAH,” an acronym of the French name) camp lo-
cated in the Mirebalais commune, which was constructed in 2004.24 
The victims of the first cholera cases in over half a century lived 
near the MINUSTAH camp, which at the time quartered U.N. 
peacekeepers who had just arrived from Nepal.25 The Nepalese sol-
diers arrived between October 8th and October 24th of 2010.26 
Though it was customary to conduct a basic health screening for 
U.N. troops, the U.N. did not require testing for individuals who 
failed to show any active signs of an infectious disease.27 Therefore, 
                                                                                                         
 18  Jonathan M. Katz, U.N. Admits Role in Cholera Epidemic in Haiti, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 17, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/18/world/ameri-
cas/united-nations-haiti-cholera.html.  
 19  ALEJANDO CRAVIOTO ET AL., FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL 
OF EXPERTS ON THE CHOLERA OUTBREAK IN HAITI 29 (2011). 
 20  Cholera – Vibrio cholerae infection, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PRE-
VENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/cholera/general/index.html (last visited Dec. 11, 
2017).  
 21  Id.  
 22 Id.  
 23  CRAVIOTO, supra note 19, at 20–23; Duagirdas & Mortenson, supra note 
15, at 819. 
 24  CRAVIOTO, supra note 19, at 8.  
 25  Katz, supra note 18. 
 26  CRAVIOTO, supra note 19, at 12. 
 27  Freedman, supra note 4, at 240. 
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Nepalese troops did not undergo any testing for cholera before de-
ployment to Haiti.28 Rumors of a possible connection between the 
newly-arrived Nepalese soldiers and the sudden cholera outbreak 
began to spread, despite the initial denial of causation by senior of-
ficers.29 The rumors were further bolstered when the World Health 
Organization reported that Nepal suffered from a cholera outbreak 
in August 2010, leaving 1,400 people infected and eight dead.30  
The initial inspection of the MINUSTAH camp itself revealed a 
poor and faulty waste system.31  The construction of the water pipes 
from the main toilet and shower area were deemed “haphazard” and 
posed a serious risk of cross-contamination.32 Inspectors observed 
that several of the pipes crossed over a drainage ditch that ran from 
the camp and flowed directly into the Meye Tributary System 
(“Meye”).33 Furthermore, contractors hired by MINUSTAH staff 
were seen disposing waste from the camp into a septic pit atop a hill 
that was not only open and unsecure, but also only a short walking 
distance from the southeast branch of the Meye.34 The disposal site 
was “susceptible to flooding,” causing it to overflow into the Meye, 
which in turn flowed directly into the Artibonite River.35 The im-
portance of the Artibonite River to the Haitian community cannot 
be overstated as it is not only a place for recreation and washing, but 
also is the source of water thousands use to bathe, drink, and irrigate 
their crops.36  
After its investigation of the MINUSTAH camp, the panel con-
ducted comparative testing with cholera strains in Haiti and those 
found in various parts of the world.37 The testing method used, 
known as Multiple-Locus Variable number tandem repeat Analysis 
(“MLVA”), found that the isolated Haitian strains were all closely 
                                                                                                         
 28  Id. 
 29  Nita Bhalla, U.N. Peacekeepers Not to Blame for Haiti's Cholera - Nepa-
lese Army, REUTERS (Nov. 10, 2010), https://www.reuters.com/article /idINIndia-
52626220101102. 
 30  Id.  
 31  CRAVIOTO, supra note 19, at 21–23. 
 32  Id. at 21. 
 33 Id.  
 34  Id. at 22. 
 35  Id.  
 36   Id. at 29. 
 37  Id. at 25–26. 
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related to the cholera strains found in Nepal in 2009, as well as other 
regions within South Asia.38 The data collected confirmed that the 
cholera outbreak did not originate within the Haitian community it-
self, but was introduced by something foreign.39 While the panel re-
port did not explicitly connect the Nepalese soldiers to the cholera 
outbreak in Haiti, the research did point to such a connection, and it 
was confirmed five years later by the U.N. secretary.40   
In a country in where citizens had little access to clean water, 
and were already suffering from the devastating 2010 Haitian earth-
quake, the leakage of waste into the Artibonite River had devastat-
ing effects.41 Within ten weeks of the first cholera outbreak in the 
communities surrounding the river, the disease had spread to all ten 
departments or provinces of the country.42 In two years, the disease 
killed 7,000 people and, as of the end of 2017, it has been the cause 
of death for over 10,000 Haitians and led to the hospitalization of 
over a million people.43  
Victims of cholera suffer from continuous vomiting and diarrhea 
and, due to the lack of hospital resources within Haiti, the disease 
itself has persisted for years.44 The poor healthcare system was com-
pounded by the U.N.’s delayed response in combating the epidemic 
because of its reluctance to admit its role in the cholera outbreak.45 
Had there been a more vigorous and efficient response by the U.N. 
when the disease first broke out, the effects would have been mini-
mized and the disease contained.46 
Not only did the U.N. fail to appropriately respond to the cholera 
outbreak when it first occurred, which lead to the disease’s rapid 
                                                                                                         
 38  Id. at 27–28. 
 39   Id. at 28. 
 40   Id. at 29; Katz, supra note 18.  
 41  See Sengupta, supra note 14. 
 42  Alex Weppelmann, Has Haiti’s Cholera Epidemic Become a Permanent 
Problem?, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 11, 2016, 1:57 PM), https://www.huffing-
tonpost.com/the-conversation-us/has-haitis-cholera-epidem_b_9662348.html. 
 43  Haiti Cholera Epidemic Kills 7,000, UPI (Jan. 7, 2012, 11:30 AM), 
https://www.upi.com/Haiti-cholera-epidemic-kills-7000/34891325953846/; Rick 
Gladstone, U.N. Brought Cholera to Haiti. Now It Is Fumbling Its Effort to Atone., 
N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 2017/06/26/world/amer-
icas/cholera-haiti-united-nations-peacekeepers-yemen.html. 
 44  Archibold & Sengupta, supra note 16.   
 45  Sengupta, supra note 14.   
 46  Id.  
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spread, but also the U.N. has only recently created a plan for eradi-
cation—a plan that does not seem achievable.47 At the time of ad-
mission in 2016, Secretary Ban Ki-moon announced the “New Ap-
proach” plan to eradicate cholera from the country.48 The plan de-
tailed the need for $400–500 million to (1) support cholera control 
and response, (2) restructure Haiti’s sanitation system, and (3) pro-
vide assistance to those who were affected by the epidemic.49 As of 
October 2018, however, only $9 million has been raised thanks to 
the voluntary donations from countries including Nepal, South Ko-
rea, France, Chile, India, and Liechtenstein.50 The fund ran dry in 
early 2017, leading to pleas from Antonio Guterres, Mr. Ban’s suc-
cessor as U.N. Secretary, to other member states for contributions.51 
However, as of October 2018, total funds remain at just $9 million.52  
Without a steady stream of funds and donations, efforts to control 
the spread of cholera in Haiti, as well as attempts to bring justice for 
the thousands of victims, will be futile.53  
II. THE UPHILL LEGAL BATTLE 
A. Petition to the United Nations 
With an admission of causation from the U.N., coupled with the 
lack of voluntarily given resources, Haitian victims have attempted 
to seek relief through the legal system, though that too has yet to 
                                                                                                         
 47  Editorial Board, U.N. Accepts Blame but Dodges the Bill in Haiti, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/21/opinion/U.N.-ac-
cepts-blame-but-dodges-the-bill-in-haiti.html; see G.A. Res. A/71/L.42, The New 
United Nations Approach to Cholera in Haiti (Dec. 12, 2016).  
 48  Editorial Board, supra note 47; U.N. Haiti Cholera Response Multi-part-
ner Trust Fund, UNITED NATIONS, http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet /fund/CLH00 
(last visited October 4, 2018).   
 49  New U.N. System Approach on Cholera in Haiti, UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.UN.org/News/dh/infocus/haiti/Haiti_U.N._System_Cholera.pdf (last 
visited Dec. 15, 2017). 
 50  U.N. Haiti Cholera Response Multi-partner Trust Fund, supra note 48. The 
countries that have donated as of October 2018 include the Bahamas, Belgium, 
Belize, Canada, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Grenada, Guyana, India, Ireland, 
Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mexico, Myanmar, Nepal, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Palau, Paraguay, Portugal, Senegal, Slovak Republic, Sri 
Lanka, Sudan, Ukraine, Uruguay and Venezuela. Id. 
 51  Gladstone, supra note 43. 
 52  U.N. Haiti Cholera Response Multi-partner Trust Fund, supra note 48. 
 53  Id.  
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yield any results. The victims’ first plan of recourse was to petition 
the MINUSTAH’s Claims Unit and the U.N. Headquarters shortly 
after the Independent Panel report was released.54 On November 3, 
2011, lead lawyers Mario Joseph and Brian Cocannon Jr., from the 
Bureau des Avocats Internationau (“BAI”) and the Institute for Jus-
tice & Democracy in Haiti (“IJDH”),  filed the petition on behalf of 
over 5,000 victims of the cholera outbreak and referenced the find-
ings of the Independent Panel report to prove the element of causa-
tion.55  The petition argued that the U.N. had jurisdiction over the 
claims of the victims as mandated by the SOFA between Haiti and 
the U.N. under Article VII, ¶ 54 and Article VIII, ¶ 55, and as such 
had the ability to hear the claims.56 The excerpt from the SOFA be-
tween Haiti and the U.N. reads as follows,  
Third-party claims for property loss or damage 
and for personal injury, illness or death arising from 
or directly attributed to MINUSTAH, except for 
those arising from operational necessity, which can-
not be settled through the internal procedures of the 
United Nations, shall be settled by the United Na-
tions in the manner provided for in paragraph 55 of 
the present Agreement . . . . 
Except as provided in paragraph 57, any dispute 
or claim of a private-law character, not resulting 
from the operational necessity of MINUSTAH, to 
which MINUSTAH or any member thereof is a party 
and over which the courts of Haiti do not have juris-
diction because of any provision of the present 
                                                                                                         
 54  Petition from the Institute for Justice & Democracy in Haiti to the U.N. 
Chief Claims Unit and the Office of the United Nations Secretary-General, INST. 
FOR JUST. & DEMOCRACY IN HAITI (Nov. 3, 2011), http://ijdh.org/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/2011/11/englishpetitionREDACTED.pdf [hereinafter Petition].  
 55   Id. at 1, 8–12.  
 56  Id. at 16; Agreement Concerning the Status of the United Nations Opera-
tion in Haiti, U.N.-Haiti, July 9. 2009, 2271 U.N.T.S 251, 261–62 
http://ijdh.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/4-Status-of-Forces-
Agreement-1.pdf [hereinafter Agreement].  
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Agreement shall be settled by a standing claims com-
mission to be established for that purpose.57 
With the Petition filed in accordance with the statute of limita-
tions, the Petitioners requested that a standing claims commission 
be created to hear their claims and provide reparations.58 It was al-
leged in the Petition that the U.N. was liable for negligence, gross 
negligence, and recklessness as a result of the poor sanitation con-
struction of the MINUSTAH camp and the U.N.’s lack of re-
sponse.59 The failed response, therefore, violated Haitian civil, crim-
inal, and constitutional law as mandated by the SOFA, as well as the 
rights afforded to the Petitioners under international human rights 
law.60 
Based on these allegations, the Petitioners entreated the U.N. to 
fairly and impartially adjudicate the claims through the creation of 
a commission and to provide compensation for both the Petitioners 
and other victims not listed in the petition.61  Unfortunately for the 
Petitioners, their claims and requests for relief fell on deaf ears. Af-
ter fifteen months of evaluation without a response, a letter was writ-
ten to Mr. Concannon from Patricia O’Brien, the Legal Counsel of 
the Secretary-General for Legal Affairs.62  The two-page document, 
dated February 12, 2013, mostly detailed the many acts of charity 
bestowed upon Haiti through U.N. efforts to control the spread of 
cholera, but never admitted the fact that the U.N. was responsible 
for the spread of the disease.63 Yet, in only a single paragraph com-
prised of two sentences did the U.N. directly respond to the claims 
actually submitted.64 Within the letter, O’Brien uses Section 29 of 
                                                                                                         
 57   Agreement, supra note 56, at 261–62. 
 58   Petition, supra note 54, at 17. It may be noted that prior to the claimants’ 
petition, no standing claims commission had ever been established in spite. Freed-
man, supra note 4, at 247. 
 59  Petition, supra note 54, at 18–25. 
 60   Id.  
 61  Id. at 33–36. 
 62  Letter from the Patricia O’Brien, Legal Counsel of the Sec’y-Gen. for Le-
gal Affairs, to Brian Concannon, Esq., Director, Institute for Justice & Democracy 
in Haiti (Feb. 21, 2013), http://opiniojuris.org/wp-content/uploads/Let-
tertoMr.BrianConcannon.pdf [hereinafter Letter].  
 63  Id.  
 64  Id. 
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the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Na-
tions to justify why the claims of the Haitian victims were not re-
ceivable.65  Per that section,   
[t]he United Nations shall make provisions for ap-
propriate modes of settlement of: (a) Disputes arising 
out of contracts or other disputes of a private law 
character to which the United Nations is a party; (b) 
Disputes involving any official of the United Nations 
who by reason of his official position enjoys immun-
ity, if immunity has not been waived by the Secre-
tary-General.66 
This section was intended to counterbalance the absolute im-
munity enjoyed by the U.N. and its subsidiaries.67 However, the 
U.N. found the claims of the Haitian victims to be contrary to Sec-
tion 29’s requirement that disputes arise out of a private nature.68 
Instead, the U.N. found that the “claims would necessarily include a 
review of political and policy matters,” making the dispute one of 
public law rather than private.69   
The U.N. never further explained why it labeled the claims as 
public law.70 The letter did not provide a definition as to what is and 
what is not considered public versus private law in the context of 
international or domestic affairs, and neither does the General Con-
vention.71 Though there does not seem to be an international con-
sensus on a definition, Black’s Law dictionary defines public law as 
“[t]he body of law dealing with the relations between private indi-
viduals and the government, and with the structure and operation of 
the government itself; constitutional law, criminal law, and admin-
istrative law taken together.”72 Therefore, because the alleged tor-
tious actions arose out of the execution of the SOFA between the 
                                                                                                         
 65  Id.  
 66  Privileges and Immunities Convention, supra note 7, art. 8, § 29. 
 67  See Kristen Boon, U.N. Flatly Rejects Haiti Cholera Claim, OPINIO JURIS 
(Feb. 22, 2013, 1:35 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/02/22/U.N.-flatly-rejects-
haiti-cholera-claim/. 
 68  See Privileges and Immunities Convention, supra note 7, art. 8, § 29. 
 69  Letter, supra note 62, at 2. 
 70  Id.  
 71  Id.; see also Privileges and Immunities Convention, supra note 7. 
 72  Public Law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th pocket ed. 1996). 
346 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:334 
state of Haiti and the U.N., it is possible that the Petition and its 
claims are partly public.73 
However, it also seems that many aspects of the petition describe 
the kind of dispute seen in private law. Contrary to public law, pri-
vate law is defined as “[t]he body of law dealing with private per-
sons and their property and relationships.”74 One important obser-
vation is that the state of Haiti was not listed as a petitioner.75 In fact, 
Haiti deliberately removed itself from the dispute between its citi-
zens and the U.N.76 Given the definition of public law, the question 
remains as to how a legal dispute can be deemed public if the state 
itself does not intervene or have a stake in the outcome.77 The claim 
is one of negligence, a quintessential tort, and has been brought forth 
by private individuals who seek relief in the form of monetary dam-
ages, which is comparable to United States citizens who file suit 
against major corporations.78 The claim, filed by the Petitioners 
against the U.N., seems to have no impact on the operations of Haiti 
or on how the U.N. conducts itself within other parts of the world. 
Nevertheless, the petition was rejected without adequate expla-
nation. The sting of rejection was followed by the realization that 
the dismissal left the claimants with no venue to bring a legal case 
since, as already discussed, a standing claims commission was never 
put into place.79 The U.N.’s rejection of the Petition cannot be ap-
pealed, leaving only the option of suing in a national court, to which, 
of course, the U.N. could and would simply assert its absolute im-
munity given to it by the General Convention.80 Though a losing 




                                                                                                         
 73  See Boon, supra note 67 (addressing the distinction between public and 
private law claims).  
 74  Private Law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th pocket ed. 1996). 
 75  Petition, supra note 54, at 1. 
 76   Boon, supra note 67. 
 77  Id. 
 78  Petition, supra note 54, at 1. 
 79   Boon, supra note 67. 
 80  Id.  
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B. Legal Case Brought in the United States: Georges v. 
United Nations 
After the U.N.’s rejection of their Petition, victims of the cholera 
epidemic decided to file a federal complaint in New York.81 Accord-
ing to the IJDH, the claim was purposefully brought in the United 
States instead of in Haiti.82 One major reason cited was Haiti’s lack 
of a class action mechanism within the court system, which led the 
legal team to believe that the Haitian court system may have lacked 
the resources necessary to host such a large-scale legal case.83 Also, 
some Plaintiffs within the class, as well as two individual Defend-
ants, were United States citizens and residents.84 Some of those 
American citizens had lost family members to cholera or became 
victims themselves.85 Finally, doubts regarding the impartiality of 
Haiti’s judiciary also played a role in the decision to bring the case 
to the United States. 86 
On October 9, 2013, BAI and IJDH along with the law firm Kur-
zban, Kurzban, Weinger, Tetzelli & Pratt (“KKWT”) filed a class 
action suit against the U.N., MINUSTAH, Secretary-General Ban 
ki-Moon and Assistant Secretary-General Mulet.87 The Complaint 
contained a myriad of allegations.88 Chief amongst the allegations 
were, similar to the Petition, negligence on the part of the Defend-
ants, as well as a breach of contract stemming from the U.N.’s un-
willingness to create a standing claims commission as agreed upon 
in the SOFA between the U.N. and Haiti.89 In addition to the Com-
plaint, the Plaintiffs also submitted a request that the court affirm 
that proper service had been made to the U.N. and other Defendants, 
                                                                                                         
 81  Cholera Litigation FAQ, INST. FOR JUST. & DEMOCRACY IN HAITI 
http://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/IJDH-Cholera-FAQ-page-
May-2018.pdf, (last visited Dec. 22, 2017); see also Cholera Accountability, INST. 
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(last visited Dec. 22, 2017). 
 82  Cholera Litigation FAQ, supra note 81. 
 83  Id.  
 84 Id. 
 85  Id. 
 86  Id.  
 87  Complaint at 1, Georges v. United Nations, 84 F. Supp. 3d 246 (S.D.N.Y. 
2015) (No. 13 Civ. 7146), http://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/ 
Georges-v.-United-Nations-Complaint.pdf [hereinafter Complaint]. 
 88  Complaint, supra note 87, at 52–65. 
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or that an alternative means of service be provided along with the 
adequate time to do so.90    
In response to the Complaint, the U.N. chose not to formally re-
spond and, instead, had the United States government seek a dismis-
sal on its behalf.91 The United States Department of Justice submit-
ted a Statement of Interest on March 7, 2014.92 Within the State-
ment, the U.S. recognized its duty as host nation to the U.N. to bear 
the responsibility of representing the U.N.93 The United States 
brought to the court’s attention that the U.N. enjoys absolute im-
munity and more importantly, that it never expressly waived such 
immunity.94 According to the U.N. Charter,  
The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each 
of its Members such privileges and immunities as are 
necessary for the fulfilment of its purposes . . . Rep-
resentatives of the Members of the United Nations 
and officials of the Organization shall similarly enjoy 
such privileges and immunities as are necessary for 
the independent exercise of their functions in con-
nection with the Organization.95 
Section 2 of the General Convention further augments this im-
munity by explaining that “[t]he United Nations, its property and 
assets wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy im-
munity from every form of legal process except insofar as in any 
particular case it has expressly waived its immunity shall extend to 
any particular case it has expressly waived its immunity.”96 
                                                                                                         
 90  Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Affirmation that 
Service of Complaint has Been Made at 5, Georges v. United Nations, 84 F. Supp. 
3d 246 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (No. 13 Civ. 7146), http://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2014/12/5-Memorandum-of-law-in-support-of-motion-for-affirmation-
that-service-has-been-made.pdf [hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Memorandum]; Statement 
of Interest for U.S. Department of Justice at 1, Georges, 84 F. Supp. 3d 246 (No. 
13 Civ. 7146), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/244540.pdf [here-
inafter Statement of Interest]; cf. Petition, supra note 54, at 1, 16, 18–20. 
 91   Cholera Accountability, supra note 81. 
 92  Statement of Interest, supra note 90, at 2; see 28 U.S.C. § 517 (2012). 
 93  Statement of Interest, supra note 90, at 2. 
 94  Id. at 3–5. 
 95  U.N. Charter art. 105 ¶ 1–2. 
 96   Privileges and Immunities Convention, supra note 7, art. 2, § 2.  
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As such, though it was admitted that the U.N. and MINUSTAH 
failed to erect the standing claims commission, the United States ar-
gued that the U.N.’s immunity still applied.97 Furthermore, the 
United States Department of Justice argued that the individual De-
fendants, Secretary-General Ban ki-Moon and Assistant Secretary-
General Mulet, also had the protection of immunity under the same 
clauses.98 With all of the Defendants being immune, the United 
States contended that the Plaintiffs’ attempted service was, for lack 
of a better term, useless.99 Also within the General Convention is the 
condition that a service of legal process can be done in the head-
quarters district only with the approval of the Secretary-General, and 
because no approval was given, the Plaintiffs had not formally 
served the Defendants.100 
With the filing of both Complaint and Response, the district 
court held oral arguments on October 23, 2014.101 The major dispute 
during oral argument revolved around whether failure to comply 
with Section 29 of the General Convention by providing an alterna-
tive means of settlement constituted a waiver of the U.N.’s immun-
ity.102  
The biggest hurdle the court asked the Plaintiffs to overcome 
was that of Brzak v. United Nations.103 Brazk was a Second Circuit 
decision that dismissed the Plaintiff’s suit against the U.N. due to a 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.104 In Brzak, the plaintiff argued 
that the failure of the U.N. to provide an adequate means of settle-
ment indicates a waiver of immunity.105 In the opinion, however, the 
Second Circuit found that the General Convention makes it abso-
lutely clear that the U.N. enjoys immunity unless expressly waived 
under Section 2.106 To allow the plaintiff’s argument to stand would 
                                                                                                         
 97  Statement of Interest, supra note 90, at 5–6. 
 98  Id. at 7.  
 99   Id. at 8.  
 100  Id. at 8; Privileges and Immunities Convention, supra note 7, art. III, § 
9(a). 
 101  Oral Argument at 1, Georges v. United Nations, 84 F. Supp. 3d 246 
(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (No. 13 Civ. 7146), http://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/up-
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 102   Id. at 4–5. 
 103   Id. at 7; Brzak v. United Nations, 597 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 104  Brzak, 597 F.3d at 111–12.  
 105   Id. at 112. 
 106  Id.  
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essentially remove the word “expressly” from the General Conven-
tion.107 Finally, the court concluded that the United States’s ratifica-
tion of the General Convention meant that the Convention was not 
only binding on the United States as a matter of international law, 
but that its self-executing ability meant that it had domestic legal 
effect as well.108 
To circumvent the decision in Brzak, the Plaintiffs argued that 
the legal question they brought was one of first impression.109  The 
Plaintiffs contended that they were not arguing the legal question of 
waiver, but instead were arguing that a breach of contract had oc-
curred, particularly a breach of Section 29.110 The Plaintiffs inter-
preted Brzak as not addressing the legal question of a breach of the 
General Convention’s other provisions. Rather, the Plaintiffs argued 
that a breach of Section 29 made the existence of a waiver question 
null and void because it rendered immunity completely gone and, 
therefore, eliminated the question of whether a waiver occurred.111 
According to the Plaintiffs, Section 29 was a condition precedent to 
Section 2 of the General Convention, and by breaching Section 29, 
the Defendants could no longer enjoy the benefit of the bargain, the 
benefit being immunity.112   
The Plaintiffs also pointed to both the language of the text and 
the drafting history to argue that Section 29 and Section 2 of the 
General Convention should be read together.113 Section 29 uses the 
word “shall” when speaking of creating a mechanism by which set-
tlements can be reached.114 In addition, notes from the drafting com-
mittee of the General Convention display a concern by the commit-
tee that if the U.N. were to be shielded from legal action in courts, 
then an alternative means of settlement must be created.115 
The court agreed with the United States Department of Justice 
and found that Plaintiffs’ argument fell short in overcoming the 
                                                                                                         
 107  Id.; Privileges and Immunities Convention, supra note 7, at art. II, § 2. 
 108  Brzak, 597 F.3d at 111. 
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broad language of Brzak.116 In a decision dated January 5, 2015, the 
district court concluded that Brzak’s holding was binding on the 
Plaintiffs’ case and, as such, encompassed the argument of a provi-
sion of the General Convention being breached.117 The court held 
that all Defendants enjoyed absolute immunity because Section 29 
did not act as a condition precedent to the immunity granted in Sec-
tion 2.118 As a result, the Plaintiffs’ request for the court to affirm 
proper service was denied for mootness.119  
On appeal, the Plaintiffs alleged that the district court erred in 
its holding and that its application of the General Convention to dis-
miss their claims violated their right of access to the federal courts 
under constitutional law.120 On August 18, 2016, the Second Circuit 
upheld the district court’s finding that Section 29 did not act as a 
condition precedent and that the U.N. and all its members still en-
joyed absolute immunity.121 In regard to whether the dismissal was 
a violation of the right to access the courts, the Second Circuit con-
cluded that the Plaintiffs’ argument did nothing more “than question 
why immunities in general should exist.”122 To allow for such an 
argument would call into question not just U.N. immunity, but other 
immunities such as judicial, prosecutorial, and legislative immun-
ity.123 Finally, the Second Circuit found no need to go into the merits 
of the Plaintiffs’ first impression argument concerning the issue of 
a material breach of a provision within the General Convention.124 
Instead, the Second Circuit found that the Plaintiffs lacked standing 
to even bring such an argument as it was decided in a previous de-
cision, United States v. Garavito-Garcia, that “individuals have no 
standing to challenge violations of international treaties in the ab-
sence of protest by the sovereign involved.”125 
                                                                                                         
 116   Georges v. United Nations, 84 F. Supp. 3d 246, 251 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).   
 117  Id. at 248–51. 
 118  Id. at 249, 251. 
 119  Id. at 251. 
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The Second Circuit’s decision seemed to extinguish the last 
hope left for the victims of the cholera outbreak in Haiti. The legal 
counsel for the victims gave the impression that they knew the 
chances of the United States Supreme Court granting cert, and then 
reversing the Second Circuit’s decision, were less than slim—as 
suggested by the fact that the Plaintiffs failed to file cert. It seemed 
the U.N. recognized this as well, as it was the very next day that the 
organization finally made its public announcement accepting re-
sponsibility for the outbreak.126 
III. THE AFTERTHOUGHTS 
It has been eight years since the cholera outbreak in Haiti began, 
and while the legal battle for justice in the United States has almost 
certainly come to an end, the suffering from the cholera epidemic in 
Haiti has not. All too common is the image of an invalid man being 
carried in a wheelbarrow to the nearest run-down medical facility, 
in the desperate hope of being treated for a disease that could be 
easily treated in a developed country that had the adequate resources 
needed.127 At this juncture, it is imperative to tell a few personal 
stories of the victims because, as its placement within the latter half 
of this Note foreshadows, the stories of Haitian victims are either an 
afterthought or completely forgotten.  
Monsieur Fritznel Paul was a father of two with a wife and five 
siblings.128 On October 1, 2012, while working in the fields, Paul 
fell victim to an onslaught of symptoms associated with the infection 
of cholera, including vomiting and diarrhea.129 The dehydration was 
so severe that he no longer had the strength to stand, let alone 
                                                                                                         
 126  See Katz, supra note 18.  
 127  Cholera Epidemic Continues to Claim Lives in Haiti, GUARDIAN (Nov. 23, 
2010, 12:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/gal-
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walk.130 Paul’s family was informed that he was suffering from 
cholera after being treated with oral rehydration solutions at a hos-
pital in Mirebalais.131 Every member of Paul’s family depended on 
river water from the Artibonite River to support various aspects of 
their lives, including drinking and washing.132 Within seven days, 
during which he continuously suffered from vomiting, Paul died at 
the age of 34.133 He left behind his mother, five siblings, wife, and 
two young daughters.134 His family was afflicted not only with grief, 
but also by the debts they incurred to pay for Paul’s funeral and 
medical expenses.135 This debt led to Paul’s eleven-year-old daugh-
ter being pulled out of school because the family could no longer 
pay for her tuition.136   
The story of Delis Georges, a United States resident, began as a 
pleasant one, as he and his wife visited Haiti to see their daughter 
Yanick Georges.137  During their stay in rural Ba de Saint-Anne, 
Georges’ wife contracted cholera and had to be physically carried 
on the backs of her loved ones to the local treatment center.138 After 
his wife lost consciousness, Georges himself began to experience 
the telling symptoms of the cholera infection and died, while his 
wife, lying in a wooden cot just down the hall, remained uncon-
scious for another three days.139 For fear of contracting the disease, 
Georges’ daughter and other children were not permitted to see him 
just before and after his death.140 All they could do was scrape 
enough money together to buy a coffin for their father’s body.141 
The coffin was sealed for burial before his children ever got the 
chance to say goodbye.142 Georges’ wife recovered after the death 
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of her husband, but was not immediately told of his death for fear of 
the shock being too much for her weakened body.143  
In addition to these stories, there are the letters sent to the U.N. 
every day as a reminder of the continuing misery that the victims 
experience.144 Politès Rozye wrote the following to the U.N. follow-
ing his battle with cholera: 
I caught cholera from drinking untreated water be-
cause my family does not have enough money to buy 
treated water. When I caught the sickness I lost con-
trol of my body. I could not stop vomiting or having 
diarrhea, which made me very dehydrated, and I 
wished I was dead.145 
Twenty-seven-year-old Saintume Julienne was affected with 
cholera in February 2012. Her letter detailed her experience battling 
cholera while pregnant:  
I salute you in the name of Jesus in heaven. I had 
diarrhea, vomiting, aches all over and I was 8 months 
pregnant. I was in danger and my husband had to bor-
row a motorcycle to take me to the hospital in Mire-
balais. When I got there the doctor put me on IV 
treatment. I spent 6 days at the hospital and later, 
with the grace of God, I gave birth.146 
Finally, there is the photograph of Elisa Osman.147 In it she is 
being propped up from behind with the help of Nurse Stacy Brown 
in a Samaritan’s Purse cholera treatment facility.148 The extra aid 
was needed so that Osman could breastfeed her child, as she was too 
weak to hold her newborn baby because of the effects of contracting 
cholera.149 If only the reader could see the image itself.  
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It is these stories that remind us that human suffering in Haiti is 
even more pervasive now than it was when the cholera outbreak first 
occurred. The epidemic has only worsened, and cholera is now con-
sidered endemic to Haiti.150 It is now being reported that, in a more 
recent ten-year plan proposed by then U.N. Secretary-General Ban 
Ki-moon, an estimated $2 billion is necessary to completely eradi-
cate cholera in Haiti.151 However, at current donation levels, the 
U.N. estimated it would take forty years to eliminate the disease.152  
IV. BRINGING THE HAITIAN CHOLERA CRISIS TO THE INTERNA-
TIONAL STAGE 
As discussed, the strategy of holding the U.N. accountable based 
on a breach of contract theory is not yielding any results.153 Without 
a change in strategy, conditions in Haiti will likely only persist.154 
The U.N.’s actions in Haiti and lack of response to the cholera epi-
demic need to be addressed. Its refusal to do so led to the first time 
the U.N.’s special rapporteurs have criticized the agency, stating that 
its mediocre and “clearly insufficient” response to the issue “chal-
lenges the credibility of the [U.N.] as an entity that respects human 
rights.”155 The problem faced by the victims in Haiti is not just a 
Haitian problem, but a human one. Informed by this perspective, 
Part IV argues for a shift towards a more human-rights based ap-
proach to addressing the cholera epidemic in Haiti.  
 
                                                                                                         
 150  Richard Knox, Why the U.N. is Being Sued over Haiti’s Cholera Epidemic, 
NPR (Mar. 21, 2016, 11:27 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda 
/2016/03/21/471256913/why-the-u-n-is-being-sued-over-haitis-cholera-epi-
demic [hereinafter Why the U.N. is Being Sued].  
 151  Richard Knox, 5 Years After Haiti's Earthquake, Where Did the $13.5 Bil-
lion Go?, NPR (Jan. 12, 2015, 11:06 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/goats 
andsoda/2015/01/12/376138864/5-years-after-haiti-searthquake-why-aren-t-
things-better [hereinafter 5 Years After]. 
 152  Id.  
 153   See supra Part II. 
 154  See 5 Years After, supra note 151. 
 155  Why the U.N. is Being Sued, supra note 150; Letter from Special Rappor-
teurs to Ban Ki-Moon, Sec’y-Gen. of the United Nations at 1–2, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/31/79 (Oct. 23, 2015), https://spdb.ohchr.org/hrdb/31st/public_-_OL_ 
Other_%287.2015%29.pdf [hereinafter Letter from Special Rapporteurs].  
356 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:334 
A. Shifting to a More Human-Rights-Based Approach to Chal-
lenge U.N. Absolute Immunity 
The international organization claiming absolute immunity is 
the same organization that, on December 10, 1948, made history 
with the creation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(“UDHR”) by the General Assembly.156  Though not binding law, 
the UDHR was, for the first time, an international effort to establish 
that "fundamental human rights . . . [are] universally protected.”157 
It consists of thirty articles that detail the individual rights inherent 
to every human and has been translated into over 500 languages.158 
Followed by the UDHR were the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”).159 Both are mul-
tilateral treaties adopted by the U.N. General Assembly and put into 
force on March 23, 1976, and January 3, 1976, respectively.160 They 
are also both binding commitments by those member states that have 
signed and ratified the conventions into domestic law.161 The ICCPR 
binds parties to uphold and respect civil and political rights, such as 
the right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment and the right to 
free speech.162 Such rights pertain to an individual’s ability to par-
ticipate in the civil and political life of the society and state without 
discrimination or repression. The ICESCR, conversely, commits 
parties to aspire to respect human rights that are usually found to 
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affect the domestic sphere of individuals, such as the right to an ad-
equate standard of living and healthcare.163 Together, these three 
bodies of work––the UDHR, ICCPR, ICESCR, and the two Op-
tional Protocols––are known as the International Bill of Human 
Rights that nation states refer to when dealing with violations of hu-
man rights.164 Many would say what happened in Haiti was a clear 
violation of human rights.165 
While the battle to circumvent U.N. absolute immunity through 
a breach of contract argument seems to be a losing one, using a hu-
man-rights based argument may give victims the opportunity they 
have been searching for. There is a growing consensus that “inter-
national organizations are bound by international law.”166  The logic 
behind this is that it would be unjust for member states, who indi-
vidually are held accountable for human rights violations, to come 
together to form a union that is then not held accountable for human 
rights violations.167  
For example, the European Court of Human Rights has presided 
over a number of cases about whether to enforce absolute immunity 
for the European Union in light of human rights violations and the 
resulting lack of alternative mechanisms to address such human 
rights violations.168 One of the most illuminating cases is Siedler v. 
Western European Union.169 The case arose when a terminated em-
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ployee of the Western European Union (“WEU”) was awarded com-
pensation by an internal appeals commission of the WEU.170 When 
the employee learned she was entitled to a higher compensation 
package according to Belgian Labour legislation, the employee filed 
suit against WEU before the Labour Tribunal of Brussels.171  When 
the Labour Tribunal awarded the employee with a higher package, 
the WEU appealed, arguing that the tribunal violated the organiza-
tion’s immunity of jurisdiction.172 The appeals court affirmed the 
Labor Tribunal and held,  
Because the internal procedure concerning the settle-
ment of administrative disputes within the WEU did 
not offer the guarantees inherent to a fair and equita-
ble legal process, the limitation on the access to the 
normal courts by virtue of the organization's jurisdic-
tional immunity, was incompatible with Article 6(1) 
of the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms[.]173 
Thus, the previous judgment by the Labour Tribunal was af-
firmed.174  
The possibility that the U.N. could be held accountable for hu-
man rights violations despite having immunity, like the WEU, is en-
couraging, but unlikely. The biggest concern for those favoring ab-
solute immunity, which the Second Circuit echoed in the Georges 
opinion, is the argument of efficiency: to tear apart the veil of abso-
lute immunity would inevitably open the floodgates of lawsuits from 
individuals seeking relief for the various acts of the U.N. or its hun-
dreds of thousands of peacekeeping troops, which would hinder the 
U.N.’s ability to realize its mission of peace.175  
However, though the U.N. is a much larger organization and has 
a much broader reach around the world than the WEU, even those 
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within the U.N. seem to discount this “slippery slope” argument.176  
In a letter to the Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, 
five special rapporteurs appointed by the U.N. specifically ad-
dressed the U.N.’s response to the cholera outbreak in Haiti.177 The 
rapporteurs recognized the U.N.’s tendency to use Section 29 to 
foreclose the possibility of receiving claims, even though Section 29 
was originally intended to provide victims with a venue to bring 
forth claims so as to promote due process.178 In response to com-
mentators defending the U.N.’s application of Section 29, the rap-
porteurs stated:  
In a variety of situations the United Nations has man-
aged to devise innovative solutions that have sought 
to achieve just outcomes that accord with its human 
rights commitments and these have not, despite fears 
expressed at the time, led to an unmanageable open-
ing of the floodgates that are so often invoked to pre-
vent new approaches being shaped.179 
Along with Section 29, Article 2 of the ICCPR ensures that any 
individual whose human rights have been violated “shall have an 
effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been com-
mitted by persons acting in an official capacity.”180 The only reason 
victims of the cholera outbreak sought to legally overcome the 
U.N.’s immunity is that the U.N. failed to provide a standing claims 
commission, even though Section 29 of the SOFA between Haiti 
and the U.N. required one.181 If the U.N. were to provide for an al-
ternative mechanism to settle disputes, then challenges to the U.N.’s 
absolute immunity would likely be few and far between.  
Another, more complicated issue is the age-old question of 
blame. The U.N.’s use of peacekeeping forces, who have distinct 
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legal status, makes it difficult to ascertain who bears the responsi-
bility when a human rights violation occurs. Forces from various 
member states remain under the exclusive authority of the U.N. dur-
ing their period of deployment in furtherance of U.N. peace mis-
sions, and yet these same forces are still in the service of and owe 
allegiance to their respective states.182  The question then becomes, 
if peacekeeping troops violate human rights, is it the U.N. or the 
member state who provided the troops that should be held liable for 
the violations? Furthermore, if the U.N. is found responsible, do all 
member states contribute to compensate victims, or only the mem-
ber state that sent the culpable troops?   
Tom Dannenbaum, who “insists that the U.N. is also legally 
bound by international human rights law,” dealt with this very issue 
by creating a new liability framework reinterpreting the principle of 
“effective control” to apportion responsibility.183 This principle 
within the human rights regime holds that international human rights 
law can be applied to states acting outside of their own territory and 
exerting their control over other specific individuals.184 Dannebaum 
applies this principle to the actions of peacekeeping forces.185 He 
divides these actions into five different categories, each category 
having a different entity—either the U.N., member state, or the 
peacekeeper himself—exerting control.186 The following three cat-
egories are included: (1) peacekeepers who violate human rights 
through an act beyond the scope of their U.N. authority; (2) peace-
keepers who commit violations under the authorization of a U.N. 
commander or superior within the Security Council; and (3) peace-
keepers whose actions, carried out under the orders of the U.N., 
would not only violate human rights, but would rise to the level of a 
war crime.187 Based on which entity is exerting “effective control,” 
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one could determine whether the U.N., member state, or peace-
keeper himself is held to be accountable for the violation and re-
sponsible for compensation.188 
Despite the difficulty of answering who is to blame and for how 
much, nation states still seem to be willing to question the U.N.’s 
absolute immunity when the lack of access to courts and/or due pro-
cess becomes an issue.189 Similar to the court in Georges, several 
other national courts have adjudicated cases against the U.N. using 
similar constitutional arguments about the lack of access to courts 
and, thus, courts have upheld U.N. immunity.190 But those courts 
have consistently noted the incompatibility between U.N. absolute 
immunity and international human rights.191 They desire to protect 
an individual’s ability to have a venue to seek a remedy.192 
If international courts are willing to hold smaller international 
organizations responsible for human rights violations, then it stands 
to reason that an individual may be able to bring a human-rights-
based claim to overcome U.N. absolute immunity. The victims of 
the cholera outbreak have pleaded with the U.N. in vain to erect a 
standing claims commission and have exhausted their options within 
the United States legal system.193 It is time to try something new, 
and the cholera outbreak in Haiti is the perfect case to try such an 
experiment in the human rights realm. 
B. The Opportunity Exists, but Where Should This Opportunity 
Be Seized? 
Using a human-rights-based argument to challenge the U.N.’s 
immunity is one option.194 The next question is, in which forum 
should the victims of the cholera outbreak bring such a case?  The 
choice of a forum could be the difference between the U.N.’s im-
munity acting as an impediment and the U.N. being found guilty of 
violating a human right in an official and public capacity. As this is 
a novel issue, it is difficult to predict with certainty which forums 
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provide the best opportunity for success. There are, however, clues 
as to which forum is probably best, based on the structure and pro-
cedures of each. I suggest that the Human Rights Council is the best 
option for the Haitian victims to obtain a favorable opinion against 
the U.N. Obtaining a favorable judgment, or at the very least pre-
senting the merits of the case in a formal setting, plays a role in a 
long-term chain of events that can benefit not only the Haitian vic-
tims, but also the entire human rights regime. 
One option, although not ideal, would be for the victims to bring 
their human-rights-based case back to the federal court in New 
York. Because some of the victims were United States residents, 
they have jurisdiction to bring a claim in United States federal 
court.195 In Brzak, discussed earlier, the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals made it clear that the U.N. enjoys absolute immunity at all 
times unless it expressly waives immunity.196 The broad language 
of the case foreclosed the victim’s initial breach of contract argu-
ment.197   
While the human-rights-based argument of a lack of access to 
courts may provide a novel reinterpretation of the General Conven-
tion, the victims would still have an issue with standing. As of today, 
the government of Haiti still has not indicated whether it would pur-
sue action against the U.N. Thus, United States v. Garavito-Garcia, 
which prevents individuals from challenging violations to interna-
tional treaties, would still prevent the victims from challenging the 
U.N.’s immunity.198 Unless the Haitian government were to involve 
itself in the cholera dispute, it is very likely that the United States 
federal court would dismiss the case once again and uphold U.N. 
immunity, thereby adding to the precedent that the U.N.’s immunity 
is unbreakable.  
A second option is to bring the case to the International Criminal 
Court (“ICC”), a forum in which it would be difficult for the victims 
to obtain a favorable judgment. The ICC has jurisdiction to prose-
cute individuals for the international crimes of genocide, crimes 
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against humanity, and war crimes.199 The ICC can exercise its juris-
diction only when existing national judicial remedies have been ex-
hausted or when it is referred a case by the United Nations Security 
Council.200 Though the ICC inevitably deals with human rights vio-
lations, its focus is on criminal cases.201 While thousands of deaths 
have resulted from the cholera epidemic and the cause can be traced 
to the U.N., one could hardly argue that the actions of the peace-
keepers in Haiti rise to the same level of malicious intent of other 
individuals who commit war crimes that the ICC usually hears. In 
other words, there is no evidence that the carelessness of the peace-
keepers in failing to maintain sewage or properly respond to the re-
sulting cholera outbreak rises to the level of criminal conduct nec-
essary to be heard by the ICC. 
A third option is to file a complaint with the International Court 
of Justice (“ICJ”), the main judicial organ of the U.N.202  The ICJ 
oversees and settles disputes submitted to it by states, which are 
known as contentious cases.203 It also renders advisory opinions on 
legal questions referred to it by authorized U.N. organs and special-
ized agencies.204  The ICJ can render legally binding decisions in 
contentious cases. Because only states may be parties to a conten-
tious case,205 Haiti would have to become involved in the cholera 
dispute. Further, international organizations like the U.N. cannot ap-
pear before the court in contentious cases.206 Finally, even if Haiti 
became involved and the ICJ makes the unlikely decision that the 
U.N. is a state, the decisions are only legally binding if both state 
parties agree to the court’s jurisdiction.207 Considering the six-year 
wait for the U.N. to finally admit to its role in the cholera outbreak, 
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the idea that it would then submit to the ICJ’s jurisdiction seems far-
fetched.  
Due to the inherent procedural problems of other venues and fo-
rums for this unique situation, the Human Rights Council provides 
the most likely avenue for the claims of Haitian victims to be heard, 
and for the victims to win a favorable opinion. The Human Rights 
Council is an inter-governmental body within the U.N. and was cre-
ated in March of 2006 through a U.N. resolution.208 The Council is 
responsible for promoting and protecting human rights around the 
world and is composed of forty-seven seats filled by member states 
elected for three-year terms.209   
The Council established a complaint procedure through a U.N. 
resolution on June 18, 2007.210 It allows individuals and organiza-
tions to bring forth claims of human rights and fundamental free-
doms violations “occurring in any part of the world and under any 
circumstances.”211 Because it allows individuals to bring forth 
claims, Haitian cholera victims would not have to depend on the 
state of Haiti to bring a claim of its own.212 Though it is the norm 
that complaints brought to the Council are against nation states, 
nothing in the U.N. resolution that created the complaints procedure 
explicitly prevents individuals from bringing a claim against an in-
ternational organization such as the U.N.213 Furthermore, the Coun-
cil’s review of human rights violations does not require that states 
or international organizations ratify or agree to the jurisdiction of 
any particular human rights treaty.214  
Complaint review and examination are done by two different 
groups under the Human Rights Council—the Working Group on 
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Communications and the Working Group on Situations.215 The two 
groups are responsible for communicating with the state or organi-
zation in question about human rights violations and working to-
wards a resolution.216 If the two groups find a persistent pattern of 
violations and bring it to the attention of the Council, then the Coun-
cil may take the matter into formal consideration.217 Though the pro-
cedure is usually confidential, there are circumstances in which the 
Council has made public the human rights violations and the entity 
responsible.218 
If the Human Rights Council were to take up the matter and 
make public that human rights violations occurred as a result of U.N. 
actions, that simple act could have a profound impact. That the 
Council’s conclusion carries no legal consequences is unfortunate; 
but, there are still benefits to be gleaned. The Haitian victims’ suc-
cess in obtaining a formal and public opinion from a prominent hu-
man rights international body would be the first step to overcoming 
the idea that the U.N.’s immunity is absolute and could lead to future 
binding decisions.  
The same theories used to describe the normalization of human 
rights during a time when the phrase “human rights” was a novel 
idea, can perhaps be applied to the normalizing of U.N. accountabil-
ity. Students familiar with human rights regimes are likely also fa-
miliar with the fundamental models of norm internalization.219 In 
1998, Katherine Sikkink and Magaret Keck co-authored a revolu-
tionary book entitled “Activists Beyond Borders.”220 In this book, 
the authors examine and detail the role of transnational advocacy 
networks in domestic and international politics.221  
Based on months of observation and study, Sikkink and Keck 
noticed a recurring pattern between activists and nation states who 
commit human rights violations, coining the phrase the “boomerang 
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model.”222 The boomerang model applies where individuals in a 
given country are unsuccessful in persuading the government to 
change its behavior and cease its violation of some kind of human 
right.223 As a result, activist groups organize and call on the help of 
other activist groups in foreign nations.224 These other groups, 
which now have become a transnational advocacy network, begin to 
exert pressure on their own governments to name and shame the 
government that is committing the human right violation.225 Now 
that there is international pressure, that government is more likely to 
change its behavior and cease the violation of a human right.226  
A great example of this model was the campaign to stop defor-
estation in the Brazilian Amazon, which originated within the coun-
try itself and then became the focus of activist groups in different 
parts of the world.227 A network of activists from all over the world 
successfully used what Keck and Sikkink called “information poli-
tics.”228 The activists gathered and disseminated pertinent infor-
mation to local residents to incentivize them to take an interest in 
land development.229 Then, through the use of accountability poli-
tics, the activists pressured the World Bank to create policies for 
sustainable development.230  
Sikkink then went on, with the help of Martha Finnemore, to 
build upon the boomerang model and develop the concept of the 
norm life cycle.231 Activists become what Sikkink and Finnemore 
call norm entrepreneurs, and as such, have the conviction that some-
thing must be done when they witness a human rights abuse.232 
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Norm entrepreneurs are usually motivated by altruism and empa-
thy.233 These norm entrepreneurs use existing organizations to cre-
ate norm platforms and campaigns.234  
This first stage is called norm emergence.235 After these norms 
emerge, the next stage known as norm cascade occurs when inter-
national organizations begin to promote such norms in the hopes of 
reaching a broader audience.236 Take, for example, the promotion of 
the UDHR after widespread human rights abuses during World War 
II. Then, states begin to adopt these norms due to the pressure ex-
erted by these international organizations and to enhance their own 
domestic legitimacy even if there is no domestic pressure for them 
to do so.237   
The final stage is norm internalization.238 Over time nation states 
and the citizens within them begin to internalize these norms.239 The 
norms become codified with domestic law and become so common 
place that to imagine a world without such a norm would be diffi-
cult.240  For example, the norm of the woman’s right to vote is now 
so internalized that many women born in the modern age could 
hardly imagine a world where they were not allowed to vote.241 Yet, 
such a thing did not exist in the past and only came about through 
the work of advocacy groups and norm emergence. 
The beginning of a norm life cycle is already being witnessed in 
terms of U.N. absolute immunity following the cholera outbreak in 
Haiti. Norm entrepreneurs, who witnessed what it meant for victims 
of human rights abuses by U.N. peacekeepers to not have access to 
a court because of U.N. absolute immunity, have already emerged 
challenging the U.N.’s absolute immunity.242 Organizations like the 
Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti have begun to promote 
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the idea that the U.N. should not enjoy absolute immunity if it fails 
to provide for an alternative mechanism to settle disputes.243 For 
these reasons, an official opinion from the Human Rights Council 
stating that a human rights violation has occurred in Haiti, and that 
the U.N. itself is responsible, would be significant despite the fact 
that the opinion would have no direct legal consequences. Rather, 
the opinion would attack the legitimacy of the U.N.’s immunity and 
hopefully initiate widespread pressures similar to those that arose 
from the Brazilian government’s attempts to deforest the Ama-
zon.244 
Just as in stage two of Sikkink’s norm life cycle, where states 
begin to adopt norms to gain legitimacy, the U.N. might begin to 
adopt the norm of a modified immunity in order to maintain its cred-
ibility.245 In the same letter submitted to the U.N. High Commis-
sioner, the special rapporteurs stated:  
The effective denial of the fundamental right of the 
victims of cholera to justice and to an effective rem-
edy is difficult to reconcile with the United Nations’ 
commitment to ‘promote and encourage respect for 
human rights’. We thus believe that the nonreceiva-
bility approach undermines the reputation of the 
United Nations, calls into question the ethical frame-
work within which its peace-keeping forces operate, 
and challenges the credibility of the Organization as 
an entity that respects human rights.246 
An opinion from the Human Rights Council could lead to the 
changed behavior of the U.N. as well as influence nation states to 
really consider modifying the U.N.’s immunity protection. Ideally, 
that norm will become internalized and codified in both interna-
tional and domestic law over the course of coming years. For Haitian 
victims now, an opinion from the Human Rights Council recogniz-
ing a human rights violation could reinvigorate the campaign to help 
stop the spread of cholera and to compensate the victims.   
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CONCLUSION 
The ideas proposed in Part IV of this Note are novel and un-
tested. Yet, they provide a sliver of hope for not just the victims of 
the cholera outbreak in Haiti, but for victims from all over the world 
who suffer abuses from the U.N. and its peacekeeping forces. The 
realm of human rights is still a complex web that is ever-growing 
and ever-changing, allowing for the opportunity to test new ap-
proaches to solve old problems. Of these proposed solutions, an 
opinion by the Human Rights Council condemning the U.N.’s ac-
tions in Haiti and questioning the value of U.N. immunity seems the 
most realistic and potentially most impactful. Though the idea of 
utilizing a human rights-based approach to solve the issue of U.N. 
absolute immunity is an option, the U.N.’s reluctance to 
acknowledge its shortcomings suggests that such an option will take 
years, if not decades, to develop and effect change within the U.N. 
Therefore, it is also important to be aware of and implement more 
pragmatic practices that will protect the rights of victims in the 
short-term, such as advocating for and ensuring the establishment of 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms when conducting peace-
keeping operations.  
The most ideal policy would be for states to negotiate SOFAs 
that include an express waiver agreement. The inclusion of express 
waiver agreements would not only tackle the issue of immunity be-
ing dealt with in this Note, but also allow for the discussion of the 
actual merits of human rights abuse cases. While smaller steps like 
amended SOFAs are a start, major policy changes are needed to 
combat the U.N.’s ability to escape the consequences of its actions. 
Tens of thousands of deaths in Haiti are attributable to the U.N.’s 
reluctance to take responsibility for its actions in the cholera out-
break. To prevent future tragedies, the international community 
must pick up where organizations like the Institute for Justice in 
Haiti left off and question whether the U.N. deserves to enjoy abso-
lute immunity. Because the U.N. has found that it is morally just to 
shame nation states into compliance in the past, it is only fair that 
the international community now return the favor, lest the U.N. 
plans to continue living in a glass house.  
